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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The order clearly being void, the authorities are sufficient to warrant the
action of a succeeding judge in setting aside an order of his predecessor."i
M. R. M. '36.
BANKS AND BANKING--SHAREHOLDERS' DouBi LIABILITY-LIABILITY Or
STOCKHOLDERS IN HOLDING CoMPANY.-The federal bank examiner's investi-
gation of a national bank disclosed a substantial quantity of unsound loans.
These, with bond depreciation and other losses, entirely eliminated the sur-
plus and undivided profit and impaired the capital. To restore the capital
the defendants (a group bf the directors of the bank), acting as individuals,
decided to form a Missouri business corporation to carry through the fol-
lowing plan: buy 1315 shares of the bank's outstanding stock which were
offered at a price of $80 a share, simultaneously make a contribution to the
bank of an amount representing $30 a share on the newly acquired stock,
and then subsequently try to resell those shares for $110 so that the de-
fendants would not be out of pocket on the transaction. The corporation
was formed and the 1315 shares acquired by it, the directors paying into
its treasury about half the necessary capital and individually guaranteeing
the corporation's note for a loan of the rest. However, the Comptroller of
the Currency took charge of the bank before the defendants could cause all
the shares to be resold, and, the holding company being unable to pay the
assessment on the shares still held by it, the receiver brought a bill in
equity against the defendants individually. On appeal from an unreported
opinion handed down in the Eastern District of Missouri, the Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment against the individivds
in proportion to the amount of their holdings of the holding company's
stock.,
Courts have on several occasions pierced a corporate entity or trust rela-
tionship to assess the "beneficial owners" of bank stock. But heretofore
the situations have always been such as to clearly support a theory of
intentional evasion, fraud, agency, or trustee-beneficiary, 2 or else the hold-
ing company stockholders have expressly assumed liability in their stock
certificates. 3 This latter element was present and was not ignored by the
court in the recent Michigan case of Fors v. Farrell,4 which is similar to
11 In Re Insull Utility Investment Co., (C. C. A. 7 1935) 74 Fed. (2nd)
510. Stenbom v. Brown-Corliss Engine Co., (1909) 137 Wis. 564, 119 N. W.
308. Killian v. State, (1904) 72 Ark. 137, 78 S. W. 766.
I Metropolitan Holding Company, Inc. v. Snyder (1935) 79 Fed. (2d)
263.2 Corker v. Soper (1931) 53 Fed. (2d) 190; Barbour v. Thomas (1933)
7 Fed. Supp. 271; Simons v. Groesbeck (1934) 268 Mich. 495, 256 N. W.
496; Laurent v. Anderson (1934) 70 Fed. (2d) 819; O'Keefe v. Pearson(1934) 73 Fed. (2d) 673; cf. 33 Mich. L. Rev. 273; 48 Harv. L. Rev. 659,
I. c. 670-672; 10 N. Carolina L. Rev. 288.
3 Barbour v. Thomas, Simons v. Groesbeck, Laurent v. Anderson, O'Keefe
V. Pearson, supra, note 2.
4 (1935) 271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886; cf. (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 149.
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the subject case in some important respects. The principle case is unusual
in that the individual defendants never held title to the bank stock. This
distinguishes it from Corker v. SoperG where the shares were in the name
of the defendant as "agent" prior to their transfer to a subsequently formed
holding company.
The case falls squarely into a recognized gap in the statutory law.0 The
actual conflict is between the policies of encouraging business by affording
personal immunity to corporate shareholders and offering protection to the
creditors of national banks. That the court, when presented with the prob-
lem, felt it desirable to support the latter policy, is significant. The case
suggests an answer to the demand for more comprehensive legislation in
regard to holding company liability. For if the judicial process may prop-
erly go as far as in this case to effectuate and implement the policy of the
National Banking Act, it would seem preferable to permit gaps to be filled
by the more flexible, if somewhat less predictable, common law and prin-
ciples of equity.
While the court's opinion is rather vague as to the breadth of the doc-
trine enunciated, the conclusion seems to be that a holding company cannot
insulate its stockholders against assessment on national bank stock held by
it, when the holding company has no other assets. It should be noticed that
this proposition goes farther than is necessary for the decision of the case,
and, to that extent, must be regarded as dictum. All the court need have
decided here is that such insulation is impossible when the bank is, at the
time of the formation of the holding company, in an unstable condition and
is known to be so by the individuals forming the company. Therefore, it
seems likely that the principle will be narrowed somewhat, for it is hardly
applicable to the ordinary investment holding company which owns various
stocks and does not terminate its existence with the accomplishment of a
particular object. In considering this decision it should be kept in mind that
the bank shares constituted the holding company's only assets. It has been
felt that this is a special situation which justifies a rule declaring the hold-
ing company's shareholders personally liable.7
W. C. S., JR. '37.
BILLs AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-BONDS OF MASSACHUSETTS TRUST
LIMITED TO TRUST FuNDs-At common law the efficacy of the attached seal,
and the incorporation of a specific fund for security, destroyed the nego-
tiability of corporate bonds. In both the United States and England cor-
porate bonds went through a long period of struggle for recognition as
negotiable instruments, though they are now fully recognized as being
5 Supra, note 2.6 i. e., the failure of the statutes to provide for the treatment of the double
liability feature in the event that national bank stock is held by one of the
various types of holding companies.
7 2 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 484, 1. c. 485.
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